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ABSTRACT
This study proposes a general aid system based on a mixed
financing model in Spain. To that end, it proposes that the differ-
ent aids available be merged into a single scheme to avoid dupli-
cations. The proposed financial model factors in the tax base of
the unified aids on the one hand and the contributory part of
social insurance on the other. The main conclusion is that the
proposal is feasible, so long as a reform of the contributory aid
system is undertaken.
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1. Introduction
In most countries social welfare insurance was introduced first for industrial workers
with low wages and later extended to agricultural workers, service-sector workers and
freelancers (ILO, 2002). Currently there are also networks of aid set up by local
authorities (at regional, provincial and municipal levels) for the needy, and the system
covers most residents and non-residents in a welfare state.
Systems of this kind are not usually homogeneous across the whole of a country.
This may result in major problems that limit their effectiveness in reducing inequality
and poverty. It is precisely this problem that the World Bank has sought to tackle in
switching from a three-pillar social welfare protection system (a ‘first-pillar’ contribu-
tory system; a mandatory ‘second pillar’ that is essentially an individual savings
account; and voluntary ‘third-pillar’ arrangements that can take the form of individ-
ual, employer-sponsored, defined-benefit or defined-contribution systems) to a five-
pillar system (Holzmann & Hinz, 2005) by adding:
 a ‘zero pillar’ based on non-contributory or social assistance aids, and
 an additional pillar based on family or informal transfers.
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The role and ability of each pillar to provide poverty relief, a smoothing of con-
sumer spending and redistribution from (lifetime) rich to those at risk of old-age
poverty depend not only on the design and associated incentives and disincentives
but also on administrative capability.
First, basic income support (a zero pillar) to alleviate old-age poverty should be
part of any complete retirement system. Financing in low-income countries will be a
challenge and needs to be assessed against the competing demands of other vulner-
able groups, such as children, youth and the disabled, but the challenges of imple-
mentation are equally strong and require close attention.
The first pillar is the typical public pension scheme funded from social security con-
tributions, with perhaps some reserves, with defined benefits or non-financial defined
contributions, under public management and possibly with an additional redistributive
goal. Initially, this category comprises different plans for various occupations (such as
civil servants, private-sector employees, independent workers or farmers), with a trend
toward harmonisation between the schemes as development occurs and labour mobility
becomes increasingly important. Its essential feature is to provide a minimum level of
longevity insurance for retirees, funded through intergenerational transfers.
A mandatory second pillar, if it is effectively designed and operated, can better
insulate individuals from political risks. Participants are subject to financial market
volatility, the risk of high transaction costs and demographic risks if they require
some mandatory annuitisation. The third pillar offsets rigidities in the design of other
systems but entails financial and agency risks as a result of the private management
of assets. The third pillar comprises voluntary and prefunded pension plans (occupa-
tional or personal plans) established and regulated to ensure a clear retirement object-
ive. Depending on the form of the benefits, the third pillar can also provide longevity
insurance, but its provision would rely on private-sector institutions.
In Europe and elsewhere, the second pillar refers to occupational pension plans
and the third refers to personal pension plans (whether mandated or voluntary); in
the Americas and elsewhere, the second pillar refers to mandated plans and the third
pillar refers to voluntary plans (whether occupational or personal).
The fourth pillar is added because a large part of consumer spending in retirement
may be derived from sources that are not formally defined as pensions, such as home
ownership, interfamily transfers and personal savings accounts.
In addition, multipillar schemes with substantial funded pillars may also have
effects at the level of individual welfare, with five main outcomes being possible in
mature systems: diversification, political isolation, choice, rate of return and lower
excess taxation. The advantages of diversification have been discussed and comprise
the diversification of risk at economic, demographic and political levels, both nation-
ally and internationally (World Bank, 1994).
Like the World Bank, the European Parliament encourages states to guarantee the
basic financial security of their populations (European Parliament, 2010). In June
2012 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) also issued a recommendation that
urged the governments of EU Member States to:
1. establish and maintain, as applicable, social protection floors as a fundamental
element of their national social security systems; and
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2. implement social protection floors within strategies for the extension of social
security that progressively ensure higher levels of social security to as many peo-
ple as possible, guided by ILO social security standards.
The ILO (ILO, 2012) currently proposes a basic level of social protection, recognis-
ing that social security is a vital public social policy tool for preventing and reducing
poverty, inequality, exclusion and social insecurity.
In many developed countries and some transition economies in Europe and Central
Asia, mandatory defined-contribution social security systems form the first pillar of the
system proposed by the World Bank. A ‘zero pillar’ has also been introduced that deals
with minimum requirements for survival and takes into account the demographic and
economic circumstances of each country (Cichon & Hagemejer, 2007; Kulke, 2007).
This could be guaranteed through minimum aid levels (non-contributory benefits)
subject to minimum requirements for households, or through various schemes such as
the ‘minimum income for integration’ and financial aids for disadvantaged groups man-
aged by local authorities (at Regional Autonomous Community or municipal level) in
Spain. However, although a network of financial aid exists, there is no single coverage
system to ensure that all citizens receive the benefits needed to guarantee a minimum
standard of living. In Spain this is a major shortcoming: the fact that the system was not
designed as a single whole means that there are major problems of coordination which
significantly constrain its effectiveness in reducing inequality and poverty (Laparra, 2011).
A ‘basic social aid’ (BSA) that brings together all these aids in a single scheme would
do away with the inconsistencies and shortfalls observed in many current schemes,
which result in disparities in the degree of protection received by different segments of
the population. Such minimum basic social coverage would need to be backed up by a
financing structure capable of guaranteeing its viability and sustainability over time in
financial and social terms. It needs to reach most of the population and cover their
basic necessities. Setting up a level of social protection sufficient to cover basic necessi-
ties would of course entail increasing the level of social assistance provided by the social
security system, and this in turn would mean redefining the amounts payable through
contributions. This redefinition is of vital importance because it has implications for
sources of financing: public funding from taxation to cover the social assistance part
and contributions from employers and workers to fund the contributory part.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
basic social aids, their definition, amounts and financing. Section 3 proposes a general
basic aid system backed by a mixed financing model. Section 4 deals with the applica-
tion of the model to Spain, indicating a basic social aid determined according to basic
necessities and drawing up forecasts under three different scenarios. The last section
offers conclusions and suggestions for future research.
2. Literature review on basic aids and financing social aids
from tax income
The idea of basic aids is not new: there are already minimum aids for various forms
of coverage (e.g., retirement, unemployment and invalidity), minimum income
schemes and proposals for general minimum income.
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2.1. Basic aids: definition and amount
In the European Union there are many different approaches to general minimum
income (GMI) benefits under different names in different countries.
Usually they are a combination of different monetary allowances with social inclu-
sion measures (Kazepov, 2011) such as compulsory training for labour-market inte-
gration (Germany, Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal) (Clegg, 2013). Although
other aid is available, GMI benefits are paid as a last resort in Belgium, Denmark,
Finland and Ireland, and are compatible with other monetary allowances at municipal
level (Martınez, 2010; MISSOC, 2011). In southern Europe, Portugal, Italy, Spain and
Greece have had minimum aids since the 1990s (Gough, 1996; Gough et al., 1997),
but both Portugal and Italy have now introduced national GMI schemes. In Spain,
Italy and Greece, local authorities provide minimum income supplements (Rhodes,
1996), although Greece has also set up a pilot programme for a national-level GMI
(Lalioti, 2016; Matsaganis, 2013).
Perhaps the most universal of GMI schemes is the Alaska oil dividend (APFC,
2009), which is paid to all residents and funded from oil production in the region.
However, this dividend is also paid to residents who are not short of resources. It is
more of a remmuneration for residency than a social benefit. The schemes most
widely used are those aimed at specific needy groups such as the Canadian universal
pension for all Canadian citizens or legal residents over 65 (Service Canada, 2012)
and the universal citizen’s pension in the Federal District of Mexico for all over 68s,
both of which are paid regardless of the socioeconomic characteristics of the recipi-
ents (Medina, 2009). Other programmes include the Guaranteed Minimum Income
Programme and Basic Low Income schemes in Brazil, under which the same family
can receive aid from different programmes.
Palacios and Knox-Vydmanov (2014) point out that new social pensions clearly
marked a turning point in terms of coverage and adequacy of systems; even if the
focus continued to be on the ‘deserving poor’, the introduction of social pensions
represented an important symbolic shift in these early social protection systems.
Moreover, the increasing popularity of social pensions has clearly been a response to
the failure of contributory pensions to expand coverage beyond a small portion of the
population. This frustration has led the ILO (2012) to shift its focus increasingly
from traditional social insurance to the concept of a ‘floor’ of social protection.
Although support for a social protection floor has been growing from a range of
actors (the G20, European Union, the United Nations), no such floor exists at pre-
sent. Instead there are different social aids or benefits with different coverages. The
amounts paid in them tend to depend on political agreements, which reflect
the ideologies of the governing parties (Figari, Matsaganis, & Sutherland, 2013), the
financial resources available to the government or regional authorities and whether
other supplementary or replacement benefits (Noguera, 2002) financed by different
organisations (the state, the municipal authorities, etc.) are available. However, some
researchers have put forward the idea of single universal benefit payments with
amounts that vary in line with factors such as place of residence, age and family cir-
cumstances (Pinilla, 2004, 2006; Sanzo, 2011). Moreover, parameters of social pension
design vary considerably in issues such as age of eligibility, citizenship and residency
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criteria, and whether they are means-tested. The adequacy of benefit levels also varies
widely, and some countries vary the benefit level for different categories of people,
such as married couples or older ages (Palacios & Knox-Vydmanov, 2014).
The amount payable may be based on an external wage benchmark (such as a regu-
larly set income level such as the statutory minimum wage or the Spanish public mul-
tiple-effect income indicator (IPREM)) although the purpose of the pension benefit –
i.e., to guarantee a minimum level of social protection – should be taken into account.
In this context, the federal government of Finland is currently conducting an
experiment on the effects of a basic income (individual, unconditional, universal
income) on unemployed citizens which began in January 2017 and will conclude in
December 2018. Prior to the launch of the Finnish experiment, the provincial govern-
ment of Ontario had already announced its plans to test a type of unconditional
guaranteed income with the aim of finding ways to reshape the social security system
in response to changes in the labour market. The sample group for the Finnish
experiment consists of 2000 individuals randomly selected from among Finns between
the ages of 25 and 58 who were receiving unemployment benefits in November 2016.
These 2000 participants receive unconditional monthly cash payments of e560, an
amount approximately equal to that provided by Finland’s existing programmes of
unemployment assistance. Researchers such as Olli Kangas have recommended
expanding the experiment in future years to test different models of basic income or
broaden the target population. This, however, will depend on budgetary decisions by
the federal government and on the results of the experiment.
Leading authors (Coulter et al., 1992; Regidor et al., 2003) have asserted that the
biggest difficulty in setting amounts is the fact that in the real world individuals have
widely differing characteristics.
1. They live in households of different sizes and types, which means that they must
be acknowledged as having different ‘necessities’.
2. Some resources depend directly on the activities of individuals and others are
beyond their control (Roemer, 1998), e.g., the gender and age of the main bread-
winner (Roemer et al., 2003).
3. There are also differences that go beyond prices, such as sociodemographic and
financial differences between otherwise identical individuals, which are currently cov-
ered by a wide variety of minimum income schemes. In this regard there is a problem
of equity between territories in the trend over time in minimum income benefits, just
as there is between one country and another in Europe (Beramendi, 2012).
Most studies of social pension benefits use aggregate public spending figures
(Figari, Matsaganis & Sutherland, 2013), although others use models based on
family units (the ‘family approach’) (Adema, 2006; Frazer & Marlier, 2009;
Gough et al., 1997; Immervoll, 2012; Nelson, 2010; Van Mechelen et al., 2011).
However, the latter have limitations due to the different types of family that
can exist.
Following the necessity-based and family approaches, Pe~na-Miguel, De La Pe~na,
& Fernandez-Sainz (2015) define the BSA as a single financial allowance paid each
year to each individual that is sufficient to meet the minimum requirements for
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survival in line with basic necessities for subsistence, family situation and place
of residence.
The basic necessities for subsistence – food, clothing and footwear, accommodation
and public transport (Clark, 2005) – are hard for people who live below the poverty
line to obtain (Guio, 2005). The make-up of those necessities varies little from one
country or region to another (Frazer & Marlier, 2009). The items involved form part
of the so-called ‘reference budget’, which is the sum cost of a widely accepted list of
basic items required by the heads of a range of households to maintain an acceptable
standard of living (Storms & Van der Bosch, 2009). These items are a standard com-
ponent of Household Budget Surveys (HBS) and can be associated with and estimated
according to family circumstances and place of residence.
2.2. Models of financing social aids from tax revenues
The funding earmarked for the payment of social pensions can come from
two sources: taxes and social contributions. There are proposals for financing
other alternatives such as GMI via taxation. The main proposals are listed in
Table 1.
3. Mixed financing model based on a pay-as-you-go system
As pointed out above, the idea of basic aids is not new because there are already
minimum aids, minimum income schemes and proposals for general minimum
income. However, there is no overall aid system based on a sustainable, standard
scheme. In this section, we propose a pay-as-you-go system as a support for basic
social aid.
Many national social security systems are based on pay-as-you-go frameworks in
which the revenue collected in each financial year is redistributed to cover the spend-
ing in that year. Technically, this system is based on financial actuarial equivalence




S sð Þ  e
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d sð Þds  ds ¼
ðtnþ1
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B sð Þ  e
Ð tnþ1
tn
d sð Þds  ds (1)
where
SðsÞ: sum of pensionable earnings of contributing workers for period s
Kn: percentage of contribution
dðsÞ: strength of interest





dðsÞds  ds: this indicates the total wages of contributing workers





dðsÞds  ds: this indicates the total aid spending updated to the start
of the interval [tn, tnþ1]
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If both sides of the equation in the expression above are considered:
(i) the initial population to be covered at the start of the period lðtnÞ, breaking
down the wage function SðsÞ into two factors (sðsÞ or the average wage at time
s and the number of people in work laðtnÞ); and
(ii) the spending function BðsÞ is also broken down into two factors (PMðsÞ or the
average aid received at time s and the group of beneficiaries lbðtnÞ),















Table 1. Proposals for financing guaranteed minimum income (GMI).
Measure Characteristics Researcher Year Scope






New tax Tax on energy Genet & Van
Parijs (1992)
1992 Europe
New tax Environmental taxesþ taxation
of non-basic income





Merging of current monetary
benefits into
GMIþ elimination of any tax
exemptions or reba-
tesþ application of personal
income tax rates to all types
of income other than GMI




Elimination of existing monetary
benefitsþ reallocation of fun-
dingþ tax revenue




Tax policy: reallocation of public
spendingþ restructuring of
welfare stateþ new tax
resources and other taxes
Iglesias (2002) 2002 Spain
New tax Creation of a GMI tax on the
revaluation of the economy.
A variant of the Tobin tax
Pinto (2003) 2003 Spain
IRPF reform IRPF reform: elimination of ben-
efits for joint tax
returnsþ elimination of
deductions and discounts
Mercader (2004) 2004 Spain
IRPF reform IRPF reform: encouragement of
deductions from quota &
refundable loans
Pinilla (2006) 2006 Spain
IRPF and VAT reform IRPF reform: rises in effective
averate rates of IRPF and
indirect taxes, VAT
Sanzo (2005) 2005 Spain and
Basque
Country
IRPF reform IRPF reform: elimination of
reductions and deductions
from tax base and quota,
application of a single tax





GMI, guaranteed minimum income; IRPF, Spanish personal income tax; VAT, value added tax.
There are major differences between the forms of financing based on tax modifications (particularly in personal
income tax) (see Table 1), and many of them are not backed up by prior quantitative analyses.
Source: own work.
















dðsÞds  ds (2)
This contribution-based model takes into account three basic factors that condition
its viability (Conde-Ruiz & Alonso, 2006):
(i) The demographics of the target population.
(ii) The labour market from which compulsory contributions are to be drawn,
including salaries, the productivity factor and the employment level of the
labour force of the country.
(iii) The institutional factor, broken down into two subfactors:
(i) the coverage of the system in terms of the number of beneficiaries as a pro-
portion of the total population; and
(ii) the generosity of the system in terms of the level of financial benefits provided
by the system, measured in line with the purposes of the benefits to be paid.
This system provides horizontal support (transfers from income to expenditure),
vertical support (offsetting between different income levels) and cross-sectoral support
(from one generation to another) (Cichon et al., 2004). However, the tendency to break
down the national welfare provision system into smaller groups that are required to be
self-financing inevitably widens the gaps in the coverage levels of benefits (Garcıa-
Nu~nez, 2002). In the case of Spain, doubt is currently being cast on the viability of the
social security system and in some sectors a trend is observed towards the division of
solidarity groups. In this context the extreme case is that of individual accounts. This
inevitably creates inequalities and uncertainties in regard to benefits (ILO, 2012).
Furthermore, this model entails financing the BSA not just from contributions but
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dðsÞds  ds (3)
where
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BSAðsÞ: sum of social aid benefits in period s
SCðsÞ: sum of state contributions for period s
One immediate consequence of this proposal is the restructuring of the first level,
i.e., the contributory pillar. On becoming aid beneficiaries all citizens would receive
the BSA adjusted to their own personal characteristics (place of residence, age,
dependents, etc.). If their welfare contributions over their years at work add up to a
contribution-based benefit lower than the BSA then they receive the BSA. However,
if the sum is higher than the BSA they also receive an additional amount in line with
the contributions paid.
Aid beneficiaries continue to receive their pensions normally, but from the view-
point of financing sources their make-up is different. On the one hand beneficiaries
receive the BSA and on the other any additional amounts due to them as a result of
their contributions during working lifetimes. In funding the BSA it is therefore neces-
sary to determine what proportion of the financing provided by the state in contribu-
tion-based benefits would correspond to the BSA.
Not only the budget allocation for social security defined-contribution benefits but
also that for unemployment benefits would be affected. Unemployed persons would
receive the BSA and any additional amount due to them in line with their contribu-
tions and the time for which they have contributed. The amount to be spent should
therefore be the proportion of public spending on unemployment benefits that corre-
sponds to the BSA. This means considering two levels: the first is the BSA itself and
the second is the additional amount (if any) resulting from contributions paid in.
Contribution-based social security benefits would thus have to be divided into two
levels, in line with the two levels proposed by the World Bank: one comprising the
BSA and the other any additional amount resulting from contributions.
4. Application to Spain
In this section the mixed financing model described is applied to Spain. This means
that the cost of the BSA for the country as a whole must be estimated.
4.1. Cost
Pe~na-Miguel et al. (2015) detail the regression factors in the sample used in the
Spanish EPF 2010 household budget survey, which quantifies the aggregate and indi-
vidual benefits payable to 22,203 respondents (see Appendix 2). The raising factor1
for the INE (Spanish National Statistics Office) sample is then used to extrapolate the
results to the full population in 2010 of 45,147,618 (INE, 2010). This gives an average
benefit of e3,820.48 per annum for universal coverage. This amount corresponds to a
main breadwinner aged 40 who is a wage earner with no dependents in his/her
charge and who lives in a municipality with a population of between 10,000 and 50,
000 people in the region of Extremadura (a low-income region) (Figure 1).
If this aid is paid to the whole population (wage earners and non-wage earners
alike) the total expenditure BSAT2010 would be as follows:




B sð Þ  e
Ð tnþ1
tn
d sð Þds  ds ¼ e172; 485 million (4)
However, to raise the level of social protection to the point where it covers basic
necessities there is a need to increase the non-contributory or social assistance-based
level of social security benefits in Spain for those people who have no resources of
their own. This means looking at pensioners, unemployed persons and other groups
(students, emancipated minors, etc.) who live outside a family unit and lack the
income needed to meet those necessities.
The target group is therefore those individuals who do not work and can feasibly
receive the aids unified under the scheme proposed. The cost of providing a basic




B sð Þ  e
Ð tnþ1
tn
d sð Þds  ds ¼ e74; 862 million (5)
Table 2 breaks down the cost of each non-wage-earning subgroup, revealing that
73.30% of the total for 2010 would go to beneficiaries. Pension beneficiaries would
Table 2. Cost per group of beneficiaries for financial year 2010.
BSA Average BSA Cost for 2010 (e M) Cost per Group (%)
The unemployed 3,176.13 10,591.7 14,148%
Pensioners 4,368.67 54,871.9 73,297%
Others 3,323.02 9,399.0 12,555%
Total 74,862.6 100,000%
Source: own work based on Pe~na Miguel et al. (2015).
Figure 1. Estimated BSA per household (e per annum) depending on region and number
of dependents.
Note: SP, main breadwinner; 1D, one dependent; 2D, two dependents. Source: own work based on Pe~na Miguel
et al. (2015).
1746 J. I. DE LA PE~NA ESTEBAN AND N. PE~NA-MIGUEL
also have the highest BSA per main breadwinner with the same characteristics as for
the general BSA (40 years old, no dependents, living in a town of between 10,000 and
50,000 people in the region of Extremadura).
4.2. Mixed model
Once the cost is worked out it is then possible to determine the level of contributions
needed to fund that cost solely from the labour market (contribution-based model).
This initial percentage represents the maximum contribution that would be payable
per working individual to fund the zero pillar of social welfare.
The labour market factor for Spain is obtained from the 2010 Wage Structure
Survey (EES, 2010). This survey gives the gross wage earnings of the Spanish popula-
tion in that year broken down by age groups. The amount obtained from the sample
population surveyed is then extrapolated to the full working population in 2010
(18,408,100 individuals according to the Labour Force Survey for 2010 (EPA, 2010)).




S sð Þ  e
Ð tnþ1
tn
d sð Þds  ds ¼ e517; 909 million (6)
The tax factor is obtained from the budget allocations of the various public admin-
istrations in Spain earmarked for funding minimum benefits, ‘guaranteed minimum
income for integration (RMI)’ and similar schemes. When the BSA is considered as
part of the basic level of social welfare provision all these allocations can be simpli-
fied. In 2010 a total of e766.7 million was allocated to RMI, and in 2013 the figure
was e1.04 billion (Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality, 2014). Apart from
these aids the public-sector social security system also provides supplements to bring
payments up to minimum aid level and non-contributory benefits for beneficiaries
with low incomes. In 2010 these supplements amounted to e8.903 billion, out of total
subsidy payments of e13.828 billion (Table 3).
Apart from the budget items shown in Table 3, 35% of the public-sector budget
endowment for contributory benefits would be transferred to the funding of the BSA
(this being the proportion of the average contributory benefit amount for 2010
(e779.89 per month) accounted for by the average coverage of the BSA (e272.89 per
month). The same would go for the budget allocations for the contributory
unemployment payments for funding the basic level: the BSA for the unemployed
Table 3. 2010 State contributions that would be replaced by the BSA (millions of Euros).
Item Contribution
Regional guaranteed minimum income (RMI) schemes (100%) 766.73
Non contributory pension schemes, LISMI (social integration and job placement for the disabled),
SOVI (statutory old-age and invalidity cover) and other subsidies (100%)
13,828.12
Contribution-based pensions (35%) 37,033.06
Unemployment: contributory level (85%) 20,931.25
Non contributory pension quota (100%) 142.57
State contributions 2010 –SC- 72,701.73
Source: own work based on IGAE (State Auditors’ Office), Ministry of the Treasury and Public Administration (2010).
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 1747
would account for an average of 85% (e615.66 per month) of the average unemploy-
ment benefit in 2010 (e842.40 per month).
This funding and all the other funds provided by the various public administra-
tions to cover basic welfare provision amounted in 2010 to e72,701.73 million
(Table 3). Current funding for regional guaranteed minimum income schemes would
be switched in full to funding the BSA, which would in all cases be higher than the
regional schemes and would serve the same purpose.
Finally, the item ‘non-contributory pension quota’ represents the amount prepaid
by the regional communities of Navarre and the Basque Country (under their
respective schemes for the regional collection of taxes whch are then paid on to the
central government) to cover the payment of aids in their regions which are actually
payable by the state. Given that all the non-contributory pensions paid under this
quota system are lower than the BSA they would be subsumed into it, so the full
amount currently allocated to funding them would be switched to the funding of
the BSA.
By applying the above factors, the proportion of the total wage bill accounted for
by this benefit in Spain in 2010 can be obtained for each group covered. The result-
ing figures (see Table 4) are the maximum percentages of wage earnings of workers
that would have to be redistributed to fund the BSA for the year in question. In the
case of 2010 the BSA would account for 7.16% of GDP with the contribution-based
model. The group of beneficiaries to which the highest proportion needs to be
devoted is that of pensioners, with 10.59% of the total wage bill. However, under a
mixed financing model only 0.44% of the total wage bill is needed.
4.3. A proposal with a 12-year time frame
Changes in the population, the economy and the labour market in a country have a
direct effect on the financing of its social security system (Cichon et al., 1999). This
is factored into the model set out above, so to examine the changes over time in the
cost of basic social aids over the coming 12 years we now put forward three potential
scenarios in line with the recommendations of the Ageing Report (European
Commission, 2012).
The demographic, economic and labour-related circumstances expected in each
scenario are set out. Given that the base year for this study is 2010 and there are
already confirmed data available for part of the time frame, the data are adjusted
accordingly prior to the setting out of the three potential scenarios.
There are five variables in each scenario:
Table 4. BSA as a proportion of the total wage bill.




KZero pillar in contributionbased modeln 14.45
KZero pillar in mixed modeln 0.44
Source: own work.
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1. Demographics: the population structure by age groups serves to estimate the
potential number of contributors and the number of beneficiaries expected in the
coming years. The general population data required are the following
(Plamondon et al., 2000):
– population broken down by age groups and sex (INE, 2010),
– fertility rates and percentage breakdown by gender of children born
(INE, 2010),
– mortality rates (PE 2000NP survey of the general population in Spain),
– immigration and emigration rates and their variation (INE, 2010).
2. The economy: the main variables that serve to forecast the state and development
of the economy are the following.
(i) GDP: the percentage of GDP allocated to the BSA serves to measure the
level of spending that an efficient, foresighted public administration can
afford without getting into difficulties in circumstances of all types, includ-
ing the most adverse.
(ii) Consumer price index (CPI) variations in the products to be covered by
the BSA.
(iii) The benefit updating rate. The 12-year time frame used here envisages a
risk-free interest rate for investment in updating the relevant values.
3. Labour market: the trend in wages and the variation in the number of people
who transition from one employment status to another2 (EPA, 2010) (Table 5).
4.3.1. Scenarios
The pessimistic scenario is characterised by negative trends in all variables. In other
words, the demographic trend shows moderate decreases in immigration and moder-
ate increases in emigration resulting in a negative net balance, i.e., a fall in popula-
tion. The economic trend is negative, with GDP stagnating, positive (but low) benefit
updating rates and a CPI that increases by a far higher rate than wages, thus substan-
tially decreasing purchasing power.
Under the neutral or baseline scenario all variables are assumed to follow a con-
stant trend with no significant variations. This means a demographic trend in which








Fertility rate 90.00% 100.00% 110.00%
Immigration rate 90.00% 100.00% 110.00%
Emigration rate 110.00% 100.00% 90.00%
Mortality rate PE 2000 NP PE 2000 NP PE 2000 NP
Economic Trend
Varition in GDP 0.00% 1.00% 2.00%
Variation in updating rate 1.50% 2.00% 3.00%
CPI variation in BSA products 3.00% 2.00% 1.50%
Labour Market
Trend in wages 0.00% 1.00% 2.00%
Trend in unemployment 3.00% 0.00% 3.00%
Source: own work.
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there are only non-significant variations in immigration and emigration rates, an eco-
nomic trend in which GDP hardly grows at all, a positive but moderate updating rate
and increases in the CPI slightly greater than those in wages.
The optimistic scenario is characterised by a positive trend in all variables: the
demographic trend shows a moderate increase in immigration and a moderate







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
BSA O CM BSA N CM
BSA P CM BSA O MM
BSA N MM BSA P MM
Figure 2. Comparison of forecast BSAs: contribution-based model (CM) and mixed model (MM).
Source: own work.




















Figure 3. Forecast for BSA: mixed model. Source: own work.
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The economic trend is positive thanks to a moderate increase in GDP, a positive
benefit updating rate and increases in CPI which are lower than the increases in
wages, so that purchasing power increases.
Finally, the demographic trend expected for the coming 12 years (European
Commission, 2012) is one of slight growth, with the population increasing from 46
million in 2010 to 48.1 million by 2020.
4.3.2. Outcomes
Depending on the variable selected for comparison and on the basis of the trends
hypothesised the intervals in which the BSA system can be found and its trends for
the next three legislatures (12 years) can be seen.
Figures 2 and 3 show the percentages of the contributions paid on the total wage
bill of individuals in work required to fund the BSA under the contribution-based
and mixed models. In all cases an upward trend is observed, due mainly to increases
in aid amounts and in the number of beneficiaries in the cycle, resulting in parallel
movements in the two models.
In 2010 state contributions accounted for 5.93% of the year’s GDP and the cost of
a hypothetical BSA would be 16.5% of GDP, so the remaining 10.57% would have to
be funded by wage-based contributions.
However, under the mixed model the contributions required are not so high
(Figure 2), because funding from taxation is incorporated (state contributions) rang-
ing from 0.4384% in 2010 to 2.23%, 5.52% and 8.57% for the three scenarios in 2021.
Funding the basic aid would entail maintenance costs ranging from 7% of GDP
under the contributory model (1.23% for the mixed model) in 2010 to 13.6% of GDP
in the pessimistic scenario in 2021 (5.22% for the mixed model). Under the neutral
scenario the figure would be 9.21% of GDP (3.28% for the mixed model), and the
lowest figure is that of the optimistic scenario, at 7.86% of GDP (2.08% for the mixed
model). See Appendix 2.
It can be seen in Figure 2 (taking into account the latest data on 2014) that the
current situation is very close to a neutral scenario. Therefore, the cost and the finan-
cial resources which are needed to support a basic social aid are well calculated and
the amount calculated is close to the real cost for the non-working populations. The
reasons are as follows.
Demographic trends: fertility rates have fallen steadily compared to 2013 and the
variation in mortality rates has fallrn steadily by 0.02%. The migration rate, in terms
of net flow, has decreased because immigration has only grown by 2.00% and emigra-
tion has fallen by 21% (INE, 2014). Therefore, in terms of demographic trends the
situation is between a neutral and a highly pessimistic scenario, but nearer to a neu-
tral scenario because these demographic variables have undergone only slight
fluctuations.
In terms of economic trends, the percentage of GDP has risen by 1.4%, which
brings it into neutral scenario territory. Meanwhile, the variation in the benefit updat-
ing rate, which in the 12-year time frame envisages an interest rate for updating the
relevant amounts free from investment risks, was 2% in 2014, which is what really
happens in a neutral scenario. On the other hand, the CPI fell dramatically by 3.5%
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due to the ongoing financial and economic crisis. Although this could be catalogued
as an optimistic scenario, the risk of continuous deflation, its consequences in our
economy and its negative influences on employment, consumption, investment and
business activity must be taken into account.
Finally, in terms of the job market, there is only a very slight improvement in the
trend in wages and unemployment, so the job market can currently be considered to
be in a neutral scenario.
5. Conclusions and implications
Calculations have determined that the cost of implementing and financing a BSA
would be so great that it would be necessary to transform the whole socioeconomic
system. Even if the current level of state contributions is maintained, and even
though those contributions would cover practically all costs involving the unemployed
and the group of ‘other’ beneficiaries, a substantial proportion of the total wage bill
would need to be earmarked for funding the BSA to cover benefits for workers
and pensioners.
In no case would state contributions cover more than half the cost of implement-
ing these benefits, so additional financing would be needed to cover the rest. This
supports the validity of the mixed financing model. Other researchers have suggested
alternative means of securing the additional financing required (see Section 2), or
resorting to the creation of new taxes, e.g., a tax on tourism or other goods and serv-
ices. However, paying the BSA would still necessitate the payment of high costs on
the part of society.
This means that contribution-based social security benefits would need to be div-
ided into two levels as proposed by the World Bank. The first level would comprise
the BSA and the second would be the additional amount arising from contributions
paid in.
Providing a minimum aid in Spain included in the social assistance level and based
on pensions that cater for the basic necessities of households would entail a far-reach-
ing revision of the first pillar of social provision. Recall that the current system is split
between contributory and non-contributory benefits, while the inclusion of the BSA
would mean that all beneficiaries would receive a guaranteed minimum aid calculated
to meet their basic necessities plus an additional amount in line with their contribu-
tions. Logically, pensioners whose pension rights work out to less than the minimum
required to meet basic necessities would receive the guaranteed minimum, as they do
now. Those who are entitled to higher benefits would receive their full amounts and
therefore would not be affected by the split. The changes made would be in how the
minimum for meeting basic necessities is defined, in the factors considered in setting
it and in the inclusion of a three-way funding system for all aids in which the state
acts as the guarantor of the basic social aid for those without income and employers
and workers fund the difference in line with the amount of the contributions made
to the system and how long they have been paid.
These findings make a relevant contribution and offer an affordable system never
before presented. However, this study is not without limitations that will be need to
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be overcome in future research. The first is that our data are not updated, mainly
because we sought to analyse the years when the social and economic crisis started to
increase in Spain. It would be interesting to undertake further research with a current
database and compare the evolution of social benefit aid. It would also be very inter-
esting to extend the study to other countries, such as France, Italy or Germany.
Notes
1. This is equivalent to the number of individuals represented by the respondent and the
sum of all the raising factors is equal to the total Spanish population in 2010.
2. For example from working to unemployed, from working to retired, from unemployed to
retired and individuals who join the workforce for the first time.
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Appendices
Appendix 1




Pessimistic Neutral Optimistic Pessimistic Neutral Optimistic
2010 7.16% 7.16% 7.16% 1.23% 1.23% 1.23%
2011 7.49% 7.49% 7.49% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56%
2012 7.86% 7.85% 7.84% 1.93% 1.92% 1.91%
2013 8.18% 7.99% 7.85% 2.25% 2.06% 1.98%
2014 8.49% 8.13% 7.85% 2.56% 2.19% 1.98%
2015 8.83% 8.27% 7.87% 2.90% 2.34% 1.99%
2016 9.15% 8.39% 7.85% 3.22% 2.46% 1.98%
2017 9.46% 8.50% 7.83% 3.53% 2.57% 1.95%
2018 9.78% 8.61% 7.80% 3.85% 2.68% 1.93%
2019 10.24% 8.82% 7.87% 4.31% 2.89% 2.00%
2020 10.66% 8.99% 7.89% 4.72% 3.06% 2.01%
2021 11.15% 9.21% 7.96% 5.22% 3.28% 2.08%
Source: own work.
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Appendix 2
Table A2. Quantile and OLS regressions by category.
Quantile Regression
OLS25% 50% 75%
Age 49.71 (128.078) 50.53 (5.28) 51.8305 (4.49) 63.85 (5.81)
Age squared 0.27 (72.2) 0.24 (2.47) 0.21 (1.97) 0.28 (2.7)
Number of descendents 648.87 (681.21) 891.53 (37.99) 1276.62 (45.12) 1141.48 (42.38)
Town (10,000; 50,000) 508.35 (256.7) 538.74 (11.04) 454.47 (7.27) 567.89 (10.14)
More than 50,000 214.60 (96.58) 199.36 (3.64) 13.96 (0.21) 96.03 (1.52)
Head of household (HH)
Unemployed
273.09 (89.94) 162.59 (2.17) 9.08 (0.1) 180.79 (2.1)
Retired 216.11 (73.17) 472.01 (6.49) 692.13 (7.88) 429.90 (5.14)
Other 86.37 (21.71) 555.33 (5.66) 744.56 (6.31) 464.59 (4.13)
Constant 1107.64 (105.36) 1370.20 (5.29) 1786.33 (5.72) 996.38 (3.35)
Income 0.12 (2662.4) 0.16 (141.707) 0.21 (154.89) 0.17 (129.09)
Gender 459.26 (248.29) 685.95 (15.05) 1001.55 (18.23) 845.74 (16.17)
, significance at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Regional dummies are also
included in all the regressions.
Source: Pe~na Miguel et al. (2015).
